# Chapter 1: A Critical Analysis of the Security-Development Nexus

The security-development nexus has become a key feature of international engagement in post-conflict reconstruction, bolstered by statements that security and development are inextricably linked. In policy, the security-development nexus is proposed as a means to implement post-conflict reconstruction in ways that are more comprehensive. Despite the enthusiasm of policymakers, scholars have argued that the security-development nexus has not lived up to this promise. The gap between policy and practice has primarily been explained by the securitisation of development, where development is co-opted by security actors to deliver security objectives. However, this explanation engages with the outcome of the security-development nexus, rather than its inherent characteristics and dynamics.

This book takes a different approach, seeking to understand the causes of these outcomes by analysing the processes of the security-development nexus. The conceptual framework for this analysis is outlined below. The first section outlines the emergence of the security-development nexus, followed by an examination of the different approaches to study the nexus, and the approach taken in this research.

## The Security-Development Nexus as a Framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Building on the increasing recognition that there will be no security without development and no development without security, external actors engaged in post-conflict reconstruction have been eager to merge security and development into a new, comprehensive approach. Since the early 2000s, the adoption of the security-development nexus has been accompanied by additional resources and the transformation of institutions engaged in post-conflict reconstruction (Stern and Ojendal 2010). As a result, the security-development nexus has become a guiding framework for external engagement in post-conflict reconstruction. However, the connection between security and development is not new. Security and development have been linked historically in various permutations.

Hettne (2010) tracks a genealogy of the linkages between security and development from the 18th century to the current day. In the 18th century, economic order was seen as a peace order; security was essential for economic prosperity (Hettne 2010). Development strategy shifted towards state capitalism in the 19th century, when it focused on strengthening the material base of the state through industrialisation reinforced by the security interests of the elite (Hettne 2010). At the end of the 19th century, with the failure of the League of Nations, development and security switched places; where previously order and predictability enabled development, in this period wealth served to reinstate order through the politics of war (Hettne 2010). Following World War II, the European Economic Community was developed as a security community, and development aid was used as a tactic of security in the struggle between the superpowers (Hettne 2010).

Other scholars have also highlighted earlier connections. Writing on South Africa, Mamdani (1996) argued that security and development were used to maintain the divide between the generally democratic, mostly white, urban areas and the indirectly ruled, rural areas, through schemes to control the migration of rural populations into cities. After World War II, the development aid provided through the Marshall Plan was in response to concerns of further conflict in Europe (Stern and Ojendal 2010). Development was also a tactic in the Cold War to prevent the spread of communism (Duffield 2010). These examples highlight how security and development have been pursued in parallel throughout history.

The contemporary security-development nexus is qualitatively different. Rather than the parallel pursuit of security and development objectives, the nexus combines security and development in deeper, more institutionalised ways. For example, the UK, US, Netherlands and Canada have introduced inter-ministerial committees and funding mechanisms to address the security-development nexus. The UK Government created Conflict Prevention Pools and, more recently, the Stabilisation Unit, and the Conflict, Security and Stability Fund, which bring together the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DfID). The US Government created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability, which is jointly staffed by members of US Government agencies traditionally associated with security and development, including the Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security. The EU developed the Instrument for Stability (IfS), which was replaced by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) in 2014, both of which are rapid funding mechanisms designed to equip the EU with strategic tools to address global security and development challenges.

This institutionalised linkage between security and development has emerged at a particular historical point. The end of the Cold War resulted in a focus on other forms of conflict and insecurity. Until the 1990s, security threats were primarily directed at a state by another state. The preoccupation with the threat of ‘mutually assured destruction’ between the US and the Soviet Union obscured threats from non-state actors (Reisman 2003). However, during the Cold War, many internal wars were underway, often supported by the major powers. Unlike interstate wars, these internal wars featured paramilitary groups, gangs, foreign mercenaries and troops, disenfranchised civilians and forcibly recruited combatants as well as state armies (Akkerman 2009: 76). These conflicts also took a different form to interstate wars, blurring war, organised crime, human rights violations, guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency (Kaldor 2006). Duffield (2010: 67) describes them as ‘livelihood wars fought by non-state actors on and through the modalities of subsistence… where the endemic abuse of human rights is part of the fabric of conflict itself’. While the state may still be under threat in internal wars, citizens also experience a significant threat. When the Cold War ended, these forms of insecurity gained more prominence.

The withdrawal of US and Soviet Union support from a number of countries, many of which had only recently become independent, also created a new challenge – weak or failed states. These countries had inadequate state structures, resulting in ‘poorly guarded borders, weak law enforcement, incipient taxation, underdeveloped financial systems as well as a large presence of displaced people and refugees’ (Kostovicova and Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009: 9). Weak or failed states are prone to conflict and instability and contribute to global problems such as poverty, HIV/AIDs, drugs and terrorism (Fukuyama 2004; Kaldor 2009). These problems have had a considerable impact on how security is conceived. Security threats have shifted from strong states that may invade or attack another state, to weak states that cannot control factors that contribute to global problems. It became recognised that state weakness, once a problem of development, contributes to global insecurity through terrorism and criminal networks, as well as national insecurity, as weak states are rarely able to meet the welfare needs of their populations, which could result in conflict.

This period of instability and persistent conflict marked the post-Cold War interventionist stage. Without the veto power of the US and the Soviet Union, the UN Security Council mandated the international community to intervene in many internal wars to end conflict and build peace. Between 1989 and 2009, there were 20 major multilateral post-conflict operations (Paris and Sisk 2009). During this period, approaches to post-conflict reconstruction evolved rapidly. Early attempts at post-conflict reconstruction after the Cold War were security focused. However, the increasing recognition of the unique features of these internal wars – from the role of non-state actors, the impact of violence on civilians, or the role of inadequate state structures – resulted in a broadening of approaches to post-conflict reconstruction. As Woodward (2003: 3) contends, by the early 2000s, security approaches were ‘beginning to yield to the lessons of the 1990s – the neglect of human and social capital, gender relations and institutions’.

The problems created by early approaches to post-conflict reconstruction provided donors with a stronger understanding of the many factors that lead to conflict and state failure and the complexity in resolving them (Ottaway 2002). In response, external actors have expanded their mandates to address the interconnection of political, security and economic issues in comprehensive approaches to post-conflict reconstruction. As early as 1998 the UN was beginning to advocate for a comprehensive approach to post-conflict reconstruction. In his Annual Report on the Work of the Organisation, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan defined post-conflict reconstruction as ‘integrated and coordinated actions aimed at addressing the root causes of violence, whether political, legal, institutional, military, humanitarian, human rights-related, environmental, economic and social, cultural or demographic’ (UN 1998).

During the post-Cold War interventionist phase, development actors also came to play a significant role in post-conflict reconstruction. The engagement of development actors in new areas has supported the institutionalisation of the security-development nexus. Early on, the humanitarian aid community discovered the impact their work could have on conflicts. The Biafran famine in the late 1960s highlighted how humanitarian relief could prolong conflict, and with it the death and suffering of numerous civilians and non-combatants. Smilie (1995: 104) refers to the airlift and the broader relief effort as ‘an act of unfortunate and profound folly. It prolonged the war for 18 months’. The development community had a similar experience with the Rwandan genocide. In the early 1990s Rwanda was widely viewed as a development success following high economic growth (Krause and Jutersonke 2005). Once the genocide began in 1994, it was recognised that development assistance could reinforce social cleavages and actually cause conflict if wrongly distributed (Krause and Jutersonke 2005).

As violence and war became more visible with the end of the Cold War, the relationship of development and conflict has also become clearer. In 2003, Collier described conflict as ‘development in reverse’. Violent conflict destroys infrastructure, services and other development advances creating billions of dollars worth of damage (Ball 2001; Brinkerhoff 2005; Duffield and Waddell 2006). For Duffield and Waddell (2006), the destruction of infrastructure and livelihoods through violent conflict creates a disequilibrium that promotes further violence, severely undermining sustainable development. The potential to advance development during a conflict is also severely restricted. While progress may not completely stop, Ball (2001) argues that ‘what is possible to accomplish under conditions of war tends to be both very limited and under constant threat of reversal’ (Ball 2001: 719). As a result, the post-conflict period is marked by widespread social and economic insecurity (Kostovicova et al. 2010).

Development has also been recognised as a contributor to the outbreak of violent conflicts. Underdevelopment has come to be acknowledged as a factor in insecurity, contributing to crimes, terrorism and conflict (Duffield 2001). Since the 1990s, 80% of the world’s poorest countries have experienced violence (Tschirgi et al. 2010b). The 2000/2001 World Development Report highlights how failed development in Bosnia and Sierra Leone contributed to conflict (World Bank 2001: 33). The role of poverty has also been recognised as a contributing factor to conflict, driving people towards violent leaders (Duffield 2001). Brinkerhoff (2005:7) argues that ‘if youth are in school, job opportunities are available and families have hope that their wellbeing will improve, citizens are less likely to engage in crime or be recruited into insurgency’ (Brinkerhoff 2005: 7). As a result, economic inequality, underdevelopment and poor governance have become recognised by policymakers as a root cause of conflict (Buur et al. 2007).

In response, development actors have become involved in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction alongside security actors. Development aid has been withdrawn from states in response to excessive military aggression or expenditure (Uvin 2002). Tools have also been developed to mobilise development resources for conflict prevention, such as early warning indicators in potential pre-conflict countries (Uvin 2002). Development actors have engaged in new areas following conflict, including justice, reconciliation, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, policing, and governance reforms (OECD 1997). The increasing involvement of development actors in post-conflict reconstruction paved the way for a comprehensive approach that integrates security and development.

Although there is now broad recognition that a comprehensive approach to post-conflict reconstruction is needed, there have been different strategies to bring the different elements together. Some actors have sequenced the key elements of post-conflict reconstruction. Dobbins (2008: 68) sets out a hierarchy of tasks: security, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilisation, democratisation and development, arguing that ‘unless higher priorities such as security are adequately resourced, sustainable progress on those falling lower on the scale are likely to be elusive’. A number of scholars agree that security should be addressed before other activities (Last 2000; Baker 2001; Jeong 2005). For example, Jeong (2005: 26) states that ‘adequately controlling physical violence and maintaining order, along with humanitarian activities takes priority over qualitative, social development, such as economic and social processes’ (Jeong 2005: 26).

Others actors have implemented elements of post-conflict reconstruction simultaneously. Berdal (2009: 96) argues that the priorities of post-conflict reconstruction, such as ‘providing a secure environment, stabilising governing structures and ensuring basic life-sustaining services …are mutually reinforcing and need to be pursued in parallel’. This approach is evident in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. Disarmament and demobilisation of armed fighters must be accompanied with effective reintegration strategies to avoid a return to conflict. Kaldor (2007) argues that if not done simultaneously, ex-combatants with ready access to surplus weapons and no other form of income generation could potentially reignite conflict.

Despite the general acknowledgment of the need for components of post-conflict reconstruction to be implemented simultaneously, it remains a complicated process. Sisk (2009: 10) argues that some elements of post-conflict reconstruction ‘are likely to interact in ways that have the potential to undercut, not advance, the goal of establishing legitimate, effective institutions in war torn countries’. As a result, approaches to post-conflict reconstruction have continued to evolve to improve comprehensive interventions in post-conflict states. The security-development nexus is one of these innovations, as it seeks to integrate security and development into a comprehensive approach.

New institutions, tools and approaches have been developed to merge the two traditionally separate areas. Actors conventionally associated with development, such as DfID, have become involved in the security sphere, and security actors are taking on development tasks. ‘The security-development nexus has become a truism that inspires policymakers to make concerted efforts to overcome the established boundaries between sectorally defined institutions and policies by developing more coordinated, holistic strategies at the national and international level’ (Tschirgi et al. 2010b: 406). In response, many governments and inter-governmental organisations have created mechanisms to bring together security and development components in their approach to post-conflict reconstruction.

By bringing together security and development elements, the security-development nexus is posited as a significantly different approach to post-conflict reconstruction. The nexus is understood as an avenue to more effective and sustainable approaches through coordinated, holistic strategies (Tschirgi et al. 2010a). Alongside security, development is viewed as an equally important objective to address insecurity in order to limit the effect on individuals. For example, DfID’s 2005 aid strategy for security and development recognises the linkages between the two concepts, acknowledging that both need to be addressed to improve the lives of the poor (DfID 2005). This shifts the focus away from just securing the state to address individual needs, pointing to a balanced and people-centred approach.

The use of development strategies also fits within the growing acknowledgement that military means are inadequate to address security threats. In relation to organised crime it has become increasingly evident that it cannot be addressed without rule of law and good governance, areas that go beyond the remit of security actors. Rather than just another strategy to achieve security, rule of law and good governance programmes consider the impact of organised crime on individuals and communities, extending beyond a focus on the state. While development contributes to security outcomes, it brings in new tools and strategies that broaden the focus of post-conflict reconstruction. As a result, the security-development nexus can be understood as the pairing of hard and soft strategies to enhance post-conflict reconstruction and ensure positive outcomes for individuals and communities affected by conflict. As Stern and Ojendal (2010: 10) recognise ‘the notion of a “nexus” seems to provide a possible framework for acutely needed progressive policies designed to address the complex policy problems and challenges of today’. From this perspective, the security-development nexus is understood as a new and innovative strategy to achieve a comprehensive approach to post-conflict reconstruction.

The increased integration of security and development has aligned with significant changes in how security and development are understood and used by different actors.The Cold War period was dominated by realist interpretations of security. Realists define security as ‘the absence of existential threats to the state emerging from another state’ (Muller 2002: 369). The survival of the state and its sovereignty was the priority during this period based on the perception that states existed within an anarchic international system with self-help the only avenue for recourse (Hettne 2010). The universally accepted belief that the two superpowers could destroy the world through their nuclear capacity powered this conception and provided a justification for the use of extreme measures. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) interpreted the meaning of security as a threat to someone or something that has an inherent right to survive that justifies extraordinary measures appropriate for security threats only, such as secrecy, violence and conscription. Under this interpretation of security, labelling an incident a security issue depoliticises and adds urgency to the issue, giving states broad freedom to respond.

This ‘traditional’ understanding of security has had a strong influence on post-conflict reconstruction. During the Cold War, it limited international engagement in conflict and post-conflict states to ceasefire monitoring in countries deemed important to superpower interests. The first phase of interventions after the Cold War were also defined by this perspective of security. They focused on building peace in negative terms – ending violence and preventing a relapse to war in order to limit the impact on international security. However, the end of the Cold War revealed the inadequacy of the dominant perspective on security. Traditional understandings of security did not consider the impact of insecurity on individuals and communities, making it inadequate in addressing the civilian casualties and displacement caused by internal wars. This perspective also neglected the role of non-state actors in internal wars. These shortfalls and the identification of new security challenges triggered debates on the reconceptualisation of security (Brauch 2008).

The result was a new perspective on security that focused on the needs of individuals, which has been encapsulated by human security. Human security was put forward as a new paradigm of people-centred security that was in direct contrast to the state-centric focus taken during the Cold War. UNDP’s (1994) initial conceptualisation highlighted seven areas of security, from economic to environmental, that needed to be considered by policymakers. However, the concept of human security has been heavily criticised. Critiques have primarily highlighted the lack of a clear definition and the vagueness of the concept (see for example Khong 2001; Rogers 2002; Douzinas 2007; Duffield 2007; Jabri 2007; Chandler 2008; Duffield 2010). Despite the critiques, Paris (2001: 88) acknowledges that the concept has brought together a ‘coalition of “middle power” states, development agencies and NGOs – all of which seek to shift attention and resources away from conventional security issues and toward goals that have traditionally fallen under the rubric of international development’. As a result, human security has become the driving force of many actors engaged in post-conflict reconstruction. The focus on individual security and non-military strategies indicates a shift away from traditional understandings of security, creating space for the inclusion of development through the security-development nexus.

In parallel, approaches to development have also shifted to focus increasingly on individual needs, becoming closely related to new conceptualisations of security. Development became a focus of the international community in the 1950s and 1960s. Initially a tool for the reconstruction of post-war Europe after the Second World War, the mandate of development quickly expanded. The 1950s and 1960s were marked by decolonisation, with many states in the developing world gaining their independence. The membership of the UN more than doubled between 1950 and 1970, growing from 60 to 127. However, many of these new states lacked the infrastructure, capacity and resources to grow into advanced economies. Against this backdrop, development became a major preoccupation of economists, drawing on contemporary growth models, such as those put forth by Keynes (Ranis 2004). The primary focus of development in this early stage was economic growth and modernisation.

By the 1970s, the economic approach to development was becoming recognised as inadequate as the results were not ‘trickling down’ to the poor as predicted. This triggered a focus on the needs of individuals. A study by the International Labour Organisation in the 1970s found that economic growth and employment did not necessarily provide freedom from poverty, as many individuals were still unable to meet their basic needs (Deneulin 2009). A new approach was developed to ensure that the basic needs of all individuals in developing countries were met. Streeten (1979), a major proponent of the basic needs approach, argued that the direct provision of basic needs has a more immediate impact on poverty than economic approaches that focus on raising incomes and productivity. While the basic needs approach aimed to bring developing countries above the poverty line by directly providing goods and services in health, nutrition and basic education, it did not attempt to develop self-sufficiency in these areas. ‘Some see the basic needs approach as the answer to the needs of world poverty, others as a plot by the rich countries to keep the poor in a constant position of inferiority’ (Ghosh 1984: 4). Despite mixed perceptions of the underlying objectives and impact of the basic needs approach, it began a shift in development approaches away from economics towards a human-centred framework.

In the late 1980s, Amartya Sen’s capability approach emerged as another alternative to economic approaches to development. Building on advances made with the basic needs approach, Sen adds dimensions of capability and agency, shifting development closer to a human-centred paradigm. ‘The people have to be seen… as being actively involved – given an opportunity – in shaping their own destiny, and not just as passive recipients of the fruits of cunning development programs’ (Sen 1999). Within the capabilities approach, ‘social arrangements should expand people’s capabilities – their freedom to promote or achieve what they value doing and being’ (Alkire and Deneulin 2009: 31). There are a number of criticisms of this approach; for instance it lacks a coherent list of important capabilities, comparing wellbeing is not that useful, and there is a high informational requirement to make comparisons (Clarke 2002). However, the capabilities approach brings empowerment and agency into development. This addition shifts development from a focus on humans as subjects to humans as agents.

Human development consolidated the shift away from economic development. Human development promoted the idea that ‘development is not about economic performance alone, but most importantly about people and their wellbeing’ (Jahan 2002: 1). Human development gained prominence in 1990 with the publication of the first UNDP Human Development Report. UNDP defined human development as ‘both the process of widening people’s choices and the level of their achieved wellbeing’ (UNDP 1990: 9). The report criticised the continued focus on development economics in the World Bank’s *World Development Report* as the ‘excessive preoccupation with GNP growth and national income accounts has… supplanted a focus on ends by an obsession with the means’ (UNDP 1990: 9).

Since the inception of human development approaches, development has evolved to include new areas, from gender, trade, democracy and climate change with a strong focus on poverty alleviation (Alkire and Deneulin 2009). Development actors have also developed new programmes to achieve human development outcomes, such as through the Millennium Development Goals. While all of these shifts have been subject to intense debate and critique, which is beyond the scope of this research, it highlights a trajectory towards human-centred approaches.

This brief summary suggests a linear shift, from hard-edged approaches to something more emancipatory, which is not the case. Alongside these trajectories, other understandings and uses of security and development have emerged. In contrast to people-centred approaches to development, in the 1980s debt crisis, when several developing countries defaulted on their loans, and many more were struggling with their repayments, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) reverted to economic models of development. Structural adjustment programs (SAPs), which were a condition of debt relief, required extensive economic liberalisation (Stromquist 1999). These programmes had a negative effect on the majority of countries that implemented them, reversing the social improvements of the 1970s (Cornia et al. 1992; Reimers and Tiburcio 1993; Samoff 1994). Programmes of the World Bank and IMF now aim to incorporate human development elements, but principles of economic development remain important. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Process (PRSP) is ‘country-driven’ and requires broad participation of civil society (IMF 2003). In contrast to the ‘harshly imposed borrowing conditions’ of the SAPs, the PRSP is ‘portrayed as “partnerships” based on mutuality and trust’ (Gould 2005: 1). However, Craig and Porter (2003: 53) note that underlying the human development principles, neoliberal principles remain. This approach suggests that some actors still understand development in economic terms. Similarly, the increasing involvement of the private sector in development, particularly as contractors, heightens neoliberal drivers of development.

In relation to security, state security fears have remained present in the policymaking of donors, particular in relation to terrorism. After the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, the US government returned to a realist paradigm to frame their security policy, with many other states following suit. Unprepared to address a non-state based enemy, the US National Security Council immediately began to develop plans to invade Iraq (Bergen 2011). Other countries were encouraged to join a coalition of the willing, with aid, arms sales, trade concessions and political patronage provided in return (BOND 2003). More recently, international involvement in Libya and Syria in particular has not focused on individual security in those countries, but rather containing a threat.

A wide range of understandings and uses of security and development coexist, some of which are explored in more detail in relation to the conceptual tension. However, on both sides of the nexus, a trajectory has emerged towards people-focused approaches, which aligns with the enthusiasm attached to the security-development nexus – in that it can bring together the two traditionally separate tools into a comprehensive approach that shifts the focus away from the state to also engage with the needs of individuals.

## Studying the Security-Development Nexus

Although policymakers have enthusiastically adopted the security-development nexus, it has received significant criticism. Scholarly inquiry into the security-development nexus has emerged within the peacebuilding literature, and it fits within the two main approaches – critical and orthodox.

***Critical approaches***

Critical approaches see peacebuilding as inherently flawed, and argue that it needs to be radically rethought. With the security-development nexus, rather than the innovative approach presented by policymakers, critical scholars argue that the relationship between security and development is not comprehensive and balanced as one side, whether security or development, continues to dominate the nexus. These arguments have resulted in two bodies of critique – the securitisation of development and the developmentalisation of security.

The primary critique of the nexus focuses on the securitisation of development. From this perspective, development is being integrated with security to achieve security outcomes rather than the comprehensive approach outlined above. Scholars argue that the ‘trend seems to be that security at home is becoming the overriding priority of both [security and development] agendas’ (Beall et al. 2006: 53). This is supported by the reframing of development objectives around terrorism, crime and conflict. For example, in 2004 the British Prime Minister Tony Blair claimed ‘we know that poverty and instability lead to weak states which can become havens for terrorists and other criminals’ (Guardian 2004). Underdevelopment has come to be understood as dangerous; ‘the ripple effects of poverty, environmental collapse, civil conflict or health crises require international management, since they do not respect geographical boundaries. Otherwise, they will inundate and destabilise Western society’ (Duffield 2007: 1). The result is a one-sided security-development nexus where development is simply another tool to achieve international security. Rather than an end goal, poverty reduction becomes a means to achieve security outcomes, shifting the focus away from individual wellbeing towards international security needs.

This critique focuses on the impact of the security-development nexus on development practices, arguing that the development agenda has been co-opted for security purposes, side-lining the key modalities of development, such as local engagement and a focus on individual needs. This argument is derived from earlier connections, such as the counterinsurgencies of the 1970s and 1980s which used development to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of populations by supporting communities once insurgents had been driven from an area (Buur et al. 2007). For example, in Malaya, only 25% of time was spent on defeating insurgents, with the remainder dedicated to development activities (Duffield 2010). The extensive focus on development activities was designed to undermine and isolate insurgents rather than enhance the wellbeing of individuals and communities.

The concept of securitisation was developed by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies to describe the process where an issue is taken out of normal politics to justify extraordinary measures (Buzan et al. 1998). Aradau (2004) argues that normal politics is how things are done in liberal democracies. As such, securitising an issue allows decisions to be made outside of the democratic political process, beyond debate and deliberation (Aradau 2004). For development, this means that approaches focus on what decision makers – international donors – deem important, not that which is important for recipients. Beall et al. (2006) argue that the securitisation of development ‘ignores certain crucial aspects of the development process, not least the development agendas of partner governments, and other regional, national and local organisations’.

In practice, there are many examples where the implementation of the security-development nexus adheres to the arguments on the securitisation of development. In 2010, the UK government demanded ‘that projects in the developing world must make the “maximum possible contribution” to British national security’ (Watt 2010: 1). This is now incorporated into the UK Aid Strategy: ‘the government will invest more to tackle the causes of instability, insecurity and conflict, and to tackle crime and corruption. This is fundamental to poverty reduction overseas, and will also strengthen our own national security at home’ (DfID 2015).

The US government has also used development to further their security interests. As part of the US War on Terror, many countries were offered aid, arms sales, trade concessions and political patronage in exchange for joining the ‘coalition of the willing’ (BOND 2003). For some countries, such as Yemen, participation in the War on Terror had the potential to undermine the fragile social and political situation in the country, which would negatively impact on development (Tschirgi et al. 2010b). Furthermore, an increasing amount of development assistance is being channelled through the military. Between 1998 and 2006 the share of the US aid budget provided to the Department of Defence increased from 3.5% to 21.7% (Brown and Tirnauer 2009). These examples highlight the prioritisation of security over development.

These changes are also affecting practices on the ground. In Afghanistan security forces have used development tools to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of local communities, providing generators to households as part of their counter-insurgency strategy (Duffield 2011). While the provision of generators may be a useful tool for households in Afghanistan, in this case there was no local engagement to determine if they were needed. This suggests that development is being employed to achieve security objectives rather than improve wellbeing. Duffield (2001: 16) contends that for development actors, ‘the convergence of development and security has meant that it has become difficult to separate their own development and humanitarian activities from the pervasive logic of the North’s new security regime’. As Donini (2010: 4) notes, NGOs in Afghanistan ‘are allowing their universe to be defined by political and security considerations rather than by the humanitarian imperative to save and protect lives’. Duffield (2007: 128) points out that approaches defined by “enlightened self-interest” often gloss over contradictions between domestically oriented security interests and South-oriented development priorities’ (Duffield 2007: 128). While ‘enlightened self-interest’ brings in the tools and strategies of development, the focus is on security outcomes rather than development needs. This limits the contribution of development, in particular the focus on individual wellbeing, as development tools are employed to protect the state. As a result, the integration of security and development into a comprehensive approach is also limited.

The argument on the securitisation of development highlights the use of development by security actors to achieve their objectives. However, rather than just security involvement in areas that have been the responsibility of development actors, development actors have also become active in addressing security challenges. Through the security-development nexus, development actors engage in security initiatives to further their own agenda, improving the lives of individuals in developing countries. This raises the potential for the developmentalisation of security, as development influences how security initiatives are implemented. In contrast to the securitisation of development, from this perspective security is co-opted by development actors to achieve their desired outcomes – creating space for development. For example, DfID engaged in security sector reform (SSR) in Sierra Leone in order to create a secure environment to ensure the sustainability of development initiatives.

The literature on the security-development nexus is beginning to engage with this perspective. Chitiyo (2010: 26) argues that ‘the developmentalisation of security is becoming the “new wave” in the security-development nexus’. Kuhn (2008) has set out how securitisation and developmentalisation influence each other. Pugh, Gabay and Williams (2013) have also assessed whether UK policy on the security-development nexus has shifted from securitisation of development to developmentalisation of security. This perspective resonates with the fears of security actors that they will lose their mandate and end up focusing purely on development tasks.

Both of these critiques suggest that the security-development nexus does not result in a comprehensive approach, as one element, whether security or development, continues to dominate. Arguments on the securitisation of development have been accompanied by calls for ‘desecuritisation’. This is aligned with critical peacebuilding literature, which calls for a radical rethink of current approaches.

***Orthodox Critiques***

In contrast to critical perspectives, a number of scholars take a problem-solving or conventional critique that revolves around effectiveness, and aims to improve performance. For instance, in relation to peacebuilding, Paris (2009b:108) recognises that the record is ‘mixed and full of disappointments, but missions have on the whole done considerably more good than harm’. This places the emphasis on identifying flaws and developing solutions.

Similar approaches have been applied to the security-development nexus, with some critics engaging with the flaws in order to identify solutions. Stern and Ojendal (2010) and Tschirgi et al. (2010a) question the value of the security-development nexus given that it draws on poorly defined and contested concepts. This raises concerns of ineffective action, as it is difficult for security and development actors to work in collaboration when there is no shared understanding of the nexus. Chandler (2007: 362) has questioned the motives of external actors adopting the security-development nexus, arguing that it ‘reflects a retreat from strategic policymaking and a more inward looking approach to foreign policy’. While these critiques engage with the problematic relationship between security and development, they focus on the effectiveness of the security-development nexus. These scholars are therefore broadly supportive of the security-development nexus as long as there is an attempt to identify and correct the flaws.

In line with the peacebuilding literature, critical approaches to the security-development nexus argue that it needs to be radically rethought. Many of the arguments from this perspective, particularly on the securitisation of development, do resonate with practice. Yet, when it comes to the security-development nexus, critical approaches immediately overlook the potential of the nexus. Arguments on securitisation prompt very little probing of why the nexus results in that outcome and not the outcomes expected by policymakers.

In contrast, the orthodox critique engages with the effectiveness of peacebuilding and aims to improve performance. There is a risk that the ideas presented in this book fall into the conventional, problem-solving response that Duffield (2008) argues seeks to lift the security-development nexus out of its current malaise through ‘more research, a better circulation of “good practice” and incremental reform’. While the orthodox scholars are broadly supportive of the security-development nexus pending coordination and sequencing, this book argues that what is required to bring security and development together into an emancipatory approach is more fundamental than just coordination and sequencing. Changes are required at conceptual, institutional and motivational levels because the underpinnings of the nexus, as outlined by the four tensions in the next section, limit its ‘success’. The research analyses the security-development nexus from a critical perspective. In line with Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009: 23), the book ‘raises questions about existing institutions, policy assumptions and the interests they serve, and is ready to challenge these assumptions’.

As a result, the book challenges both critical and orthodox perspectives on the security-development nexus. With a starting point that engages with the positive potential of the security-development nexus, the research does not immediately call for a radical rethink of the nexus, and it challenges arguments on the securitisation of development. However, it acknowledges that there are no easy fixes for the security-development nexus, and the emphasis on emancipation is critical of the universal liberal blueprint put forward by orthodox scholars. This is achieved by adopting the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies as a theoretical model.

## Examining the Security-Development Nexus

In order to establish why the security-development nexus is more closely aligned to the critiques on the securitisation of development than the expectations of policymakers, this book investigates what inhibits the integration between security and development. Drawing on the enthusiasm of policymakers, the research engages with the positive potential of the security-development nexus to investigate why the relationship, or site of integration between security and development is flawed. This investigation into the disjuncture between the theory and practice of the security-development nexus aligns with the assumptions of the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies.

Building on constructivist theories, critical approaches to security studies engage in a critique of traditional security approaches. Rather than a distinct theoretical perspective, critical approaches to security studies tend to be defined in contrast to the ontology, epistemology, starting point and assumptions of traditional approaches to security, particularly realism. This includes the ‘emphasis upon parsimony and coherence; its privileging of a rational, state centric worldview based upon the primacy of military power in an anarchic environment; its emphasis upon order and predictability as positive values; and its structural view of international politics as ahistorical, recurrent, and non-contextual’ (Newman 2010: 83).

Critical theories also seek to move beyond a traditional approach to security. Critical security studies is based on the assumption that ‘security can operate according to a different logic: that progressive ends can be achieved through security rather than outside it’ (McDonald 2008: 71). The Welsh School of Critical Security Studies in particular takes a positive view of security. Rather than focusing on security in terms of threats, the Welsh School’s interpretation is closer to Cicero’s early interpretation as the ‘absence of distress’ (cited in Wæver 2008). As such, security is understood to be broader than just state security. ‘Broadening securitisation will broaden “real” security (and bring resources and attention) to a wider range of problems and actors beyond the state’ (Newman 2010: 85-86). The Welsh School takes a normative approach, distinguished by its ‘desire to radically reconceive security as the emancipation of individuals and communities from structural constraints’ (Burke 2007: 6). As such, security is imbued with the potential to be emancipatory, rather than militaristic and state-centred.

As this research is situated within the disjuncture between the potential of the nexus and its critiques, it engages in immanent critique. A key element of critical security studies, immanent critique compares the outcomes – the securitisation of development, with the stated objectives – a comprehensive approach that integrates security and development (Stamnes 2004). The securitisation of development adheres to a traditional security perspective, as it adopts development to the extent that it achieves security outcomes. A comprehensive approach that integrates the two shifts away from traditional security approaches to become more emancipatory.

For the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies, emancipation is the desired end goal of security, but it is only vaguely defined, which weakens its value as an analytical tool. For Booth, emancipation is a process to be defined by those whose security is in question: ‘what the world will look like must be settled by those future generations, when new and different possibilities and problems become clearer’ (Booth 1990: 3). While Critical Security Studies provides some guidance as to what emancipation is, the actual conceptualisation should be derived from those experiencing emancipation. Such a conceptualisation is limited as an analytical tool without extensive research involving the intended beneficiaries of post-conflict reconstruction. As a result, a more concrete conceptualisation is required.

Within this research, emancipation is operationalised through human security. Human security provides the theoretical basis for the integration of security and development into a nexus that is emancipatory. Human security has been heavily criticised.[[1]](#endnote-1) Tadjbakhsh (2014: 4) notes that ‘what was supposed to be a simple, noble and obvious idea soon became engulfed in a cacophony of political and academic debates centred on its definitions, their advantages and weak points, and on its theoretical and practical applicability’. Despite these criticisms there remains value in the key tenets of human security.

Richmond (2007: 460) describes two versions of human security – ‘the institutional approach and the emancipatory approach – and while one sees the creation of liberal institutions to protect human security as paramount, the other aims at empowerment of individuals and the removal of unnecessary constraints over their lives’. While policy communities have readily adopted the first version, resulting in what Christie (2010: 170) has labelled a ‘new orthodoxy’, the latter version still holds the potential to articulate what emancipation involves. Some scholars continue to challenge the emancipatory potential of human security (see for example Williams and Krause 1997; McCormack 2008). Taken out of its policy context there is still value in the concept. As Christie (2010: 170) argues ‘human security retains some limited critical potential for engaging with particular security problems and may be usefully employed for narrowly defined short-term goals’. For this research, human security is used as a lens to highlight the distinction between a traditional security approach and a new, emancipatory approach that reifies comprehensiveness.

Despite its critics, human security presents the opposite end of the spectrum from traditional security approaches. As such, it articulates in more detail what emancipation involves. This provides analytical grasp to the positive potential of the security-development nexus.

**Operationalising the theory**

The research takes a positive starting point based on the enthusiasm of policymakers adopting the nexus. In contrast to a traditional security approach to organised crime, which engages with the threat posed by criminal activity to the state and seeks to disrupt it through law enforcement or military strategies, this research engages with the idea of an integrated and holistic approach that brings security and development together in an emancipatory approach. As well as focusing on the security threat posed by organised crime, such an approach would ensure that the impact of organised crime on development is also recognised, but also that development strategies are employed to address the factors that make a country conducive to organised crime. The inclusion of development is also expected to bring a new set of practices, particularly with the focus of many development actors on local engagement and people-centred approaches.

It is recognised that the security-development nexus is not perfect, as it is still influenced by resources, the personality of personnel and other factors. Similarly, as outlined above, understandings and uses of security and development differ significantly. However, to analyse the security-development nexus and understand how the hypothesised tensions influence the integration of security and development, a spectrum is established between a traditional security approach and an integrated, emancipatory approach.[[2]](#endnote-2) Analysis investigates what inhibits a shift away from a traditional security approach towards the other end of the spectrum, recognising that a complete shift is impossible.

**Methodology**

Methodologically, critical security studies is based on constructivist foundations, where the security-development nexus is understood as a concept that is given meaning by the actors that employ it. As such, the nuances in how the security-development nexus is understood and applied by external actors engaged in post-conflict reconstruction are examined.

Critical security studies is distinguished from other epistemological approaches by its ‘methodological flexibility’ (Salter 2013: 17). The emphasis is on using the best tools for the specific research question. Increasingly, critical security scholars are drawing on different approaches to inform their research design and choice of methods. Salter and Mutlu (2013) outline five different approaches to research within critical security studies: the ethnographic turn, the practice turn, the discursive turn, the corporeal turn and the material turn. As this research posits that the outcomes of the security-development nexus are a function of its implementation, it examines how the nexus is put into practice. As such, it fits within the practice turn.

Drawing on practice theory, the practice turn has its foundations in philosophy and sociology. It has only recently been applied to international relations, most notably through studies by Bigo (1996; 2002), Pouliot (2010) and Williams (2007). For Neumann (2002), practice theory provides a valuable tool for international studies, as it entails a shift away from ‘armchair analysis’ to investigate how social action is enacted in and on the world. It draws on Wittgenstein’s contention that the meaning of a concept is understood by analysing how it is used (cited in Collins 2001). Accordingly, this research engages with the security-development nexus as it is adopted and implemented by external actors addressing organised crime as part of post-conflict reconstruction. The research focuses on the integration of security and development into a nexus and why this might be problematic. Examining how the nexus is put into practice reveals tensions between the two components of the nexus and factors inhibiting their integration. The research posits that this produces a flawed integration that results in the outcomes that critics of the nexus have focused on, rather than a comprehensive approach.

As this research seeks to understand how the security-development nexus is implemented in practice, it draws on in-depth qualitative analysis. Two cases were selected of external actors addressing organised crime as part of broader post-conflict reconstruction efforts – the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) in Sierra Leone and the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.[[3]](#endnote-3) These cases were selected as they have sufficient similarities to facilitate comparison. However, they also have key differences that allow for an examination of the tensions in significantly different contexts.

In Sierra Leone, there were many and varied actors addressing organised crime connected through the WACI. The initiative was developed in response to the Political Declaration on the Prevention of Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organised Crime in West Africa and its accompanying Regional Action Plan drafted by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The WACI is an inter-agency project to address organised crime and illicit drug trafficking, bringing together UNODC, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) and Interpol. However, on the ground, implementation of the WACI was primarily driven by the UN Peacebuilding Mission in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) and UNODC officers based in the country. The focus of this research was the core WACI project in Sierra Leone, SLEU74 ‘Building Institutional Capacity to Respond to the Threat Posed by Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organised Crime in Sierra Leone’, which was implemented from April 2010 – April 2013.

Until June 2012, organised crime was addressed in Bosnia by EUPM. The mission took over from the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) in 2003 to continue the police reform process. Since then the mission has evolved through four phases. The focus of this research was EUPM IV, which commenced in January 2010 until the mission ended in June 2012. The fourth phase focused solely on organised crime and corruption. The fourth phase also provides a better insight into the EU’s initiatives within the security-development nexus, as by 2010, the EU had articulated its policy in this area.

For both case studies, field research was conducted in the final phases of the programmes as key personnel were still in place, but were beginning to reflect on implementation. Research was conducted in Bosnia in October 2011 and March 2012, and in Sierra Leone in January and February 2012. Research relied on two data sources – interviews with international, national and civil society actors; and official documentation from international actors addressing organised crime.

During field visits, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the key international actors engaged in initiatives to address organised crime. These interviews were designed to determine how individuals within international organisations engaging with organised crime witnessed and understood the implementation of the security-development nexus. They also sought to understand the factors that influence the security-development nexus, which will be set out in the empirical chapters that discuss the tensions. Interviews were also conducted with other actors connected to initiatives to address organised crime, including local law enforcement agencies, international NGOs, diplomatic representatives and civil society actors. The aim of these interviews was to elicit a secondary perspective on how the security-development nexus is implemented. Particularly with actors that work in partnership with the key international organisations engaged with organised crime, these interviews provided another layer to triangulate the findings.

As this research is situated within the disjuncture between the potential of the nexus and its critiques, it engages in immanent critique. A key element of critical security studies, immanent critique compares the outcomes – the securitisation of development, with the stated objectives – a comprehensive approach that integrates security and development (Stamnes 2004). As Booth (2005: 11) points out however, immanent critique cannot assess practices on the basis of blueprints that are not possible in reality. Rather analysis needs to be based on unfulfilled potential that already exists. The focus on ‘immanent, unrealised or unfulfilled possibilities’ gives the analysis critical purchase, preventing recommendations that call for possibilities that are out of reach (Wyn-Jones 2005: 221). Postone and Brick (1993: 230) argue that this unfulfilled potential needs to be located within the existing society, not judged from outside as a ‘transcendental ought’. While it can be argued that the integration of security and development ‘ought’ to result in a new, comprehensive approach, this needs to be possible, or immanent, in its existence to account for the unfulfilled potential. This ‘unfulfilled potential’ has been highlighted above as the security-development nexus is adopted as a new form of comprehensive approach to post-conflict reconstruction. Chapter 3 engages with the selected case studies in more detail, outlining how the implementing agencies perceived the security-development nexus, thus establishing the benchmark for this ‘unfulfilled potential’.

Through immanent critique, the book examines the security-development nexus from the standpoint of its positive potential operationalised through human security. From this perspective, four tensions are examined to track the divergence of the security-development nexus from this potential, and show how the integration of security and development is inhibited.

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1. The criticisms of human security have been addressed in detail by Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007). [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. This spectrum is outlined in more depth in the discussion of each tension in Chapter 1. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Hereafter referred to as Bosnia. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)