**Post-Neoliberal Developmental Regimes in Latin America: Argentina under Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner**

This article seeks to analyse the concept of post-neoliberalism through state theory, grounded in an understanding of the state as an historical institution influenced by both domestic and international forces. This theoretical exercise is complemented with a discussion of contemporary Argentina under the Presidency of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK), showing that focus on a ‘developmental regime tripod’ reveals underlying tensions in the post-neoliberal model as a result of a desire to 'deepen that model' combined with shifts in the nature of IPE in the wake of the global financial crisis.

*Keywords: post neoliberalism, globalisation, developmental regime, Argentina, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner*

Significant scholarly effort has gone into characterising the alternative models of capital accumulation that have emerged in twenty-first Century Latin America. Dubbed the ‘pink tide’ this phenomenon has resisted attempts to classify its different aspects. Setting aside the more obvious polemical attempts, such as Castañeda (2006), more balanced approaches have been able to shed further light on the nature of these models. The concept of 'post-neoliberalism' has provided the most convincing framework (see MacDonald and Ruckert, 2009; Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2007); defined as ‘more than simply the return of the state in terms of the economy... it is also a call for a new kind of politics, rooted in, and responsive to, local traditions and communities and an attempt to forge a new pact between society and the state’ (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012: 3). It is *post* neoliberal as neoliberalism itself champions more a night-watchman role for the state in the market (Nozick, 1974), combined with analytical separation of state from society (Radice, 2008).

Post-neoliberalism captures the broad thrust of this phenomenon, offering a useful framework for understanding a very real shift in Latin American political economy that is neither a return to the old ISI models of the twentieth century or a simple continuation of neoliberal policies. Much like Williamson's phrase 'Washington Consensus' captured the global shift in political economy in the 1990s, post-neoliberalism captures the continental shift in Latin American political economy in the twenty first century. Also like the term Washington Consensus, the term post-neoliberalism can be critiqued for not being sufficiently sensitive to national level idiosyncracities. One solution to this is to eject these frameworks and embrace the sui generis nature of different national contexts. An alternative that this article will explore suggests that what is needed to make sense of these different forces is a robust theory of the state. Indeed, it has become essential, for any further advance of the post-neoliberal project in Latin America, that theories are developed that allow an understanding of the real historical situation that the region confronts, 'with its strengths and weaknesses, the real, concrete and global balance of force, the challenges and possible solutions' (Sader, 2011: 75).

Post-neoliberalism brings with it new theoretical challenges. In order to accurately map the contours of these transformations and the new political economy that underpins them, the concept of post-neoliberalism itself must be augmented with a theoretical framework for understanding the state; with this article proposing the developmental regime approach. The new circumstances that social and political struggles face in the region mean a new kind of practice needs to be explained. The term post-neoliberalism has been coined to help characterise and explain these new practices. However, as a concept it is rather ambiguous and lacks a clear definition. This article attempts to shed further light on this concept, and in the process transcend at least some of this ambiguity. This will be achieved through an exploration of both state capacity and state autonomy, and how different constellations of state-market and state-society relationships facilitate contemporary developmental regimes in Latin America. Such a theory is able to simultaneously articulate the changing social relations that underpin the post-neoliberal state and its public policy profile, and the interaction of that form with the forces of contemporary neoliberal globalisation. As such, the article will conclude that post-neoliberalism is still a process of reforms, but one that leads towards a substantial transformation of the relations of power that underpin the neoliberal state (Sader, 2011: 111).

Post-neoliberalism has increasingly been used to characterise a global shift in development strategy, and therefore move beyond analysis of Latin American developmental regimes. Gerard Strange (2013) has shown post-neoliberalism to be a useful concept for aiding our understanding of the evolution of global neoliberalism away from a narrow characterisation within the Washington Consensus. How these global forces have manifested themselves at the national level needs to be better understood, and analysis of contemporary post-neoliberal regimes is the first step towards achieving this goal. As well as new domestic constituencies in the wake of social and structural change, post-neoliberal regimes have had to deal with the realities of globalisation, its characterisation fundamentally within the neoliberal paradigm, and the subsequent realisation that there is little room for an anti-systemic model. The different interests of the new constituencies that constitute the post-neoliberal social contract must be understood not only in the context of domestic crisis and economic change, but also through the lens of globalisation and the interests of different fractions of capital.

These changes will be explored in the context of one such case: Argentina under the Kirchner’s and the reformulation of the development model in that country after the crisis of 2001-02 from neoliberalism in the 1990s under Carlos Menem to a more state-centric neo-developmentalist model. Argentina’s rejection of neoliberalism in the post-crisis period did not facilitate a return to old models of development – ISI and populism. Rather, a new model was articulated, one that possesses elements of continuity as well as change with both pre-crisis neoliberalism and more historical forms of political economy such as the structuralism of Perón and the subsequent *desarrollista* governments. This new model, dubbed *neodesarrollismo*, led to a dramatic economic recovery from 2003 onwards, one that was coupled with poverty reduction and even moderate declines in inequality. As such, it has challenged existing notions of the ‘logic of globalisation’ and hegemony of neoliberal political economy (Nem Singh, 2014: 330).

Nevertheless, this model has not been without its problems and, despite an impressive v-shaped recovery in the wake of the global financial crisis, recent events have exposed some tensions within this new model of capital accumulation. These tensions have been the result of a desire on the part of the state to maintain the macroeconomic architecture that was so successful in the post-crisis period in the face of strong international economic and political headwinds, combined with CFK's stated intention to 'deepen the model' (Kirchner, cited in Telam, 2013). This deepening has occurred through increased and sustained fiscal outlay in the form of welfare payments and extensions to the minimum wage combined with sustained state intervention to facilitate increasing industrialisation in the economy. This article will argue that these tensions are the product of the interests of certain fractions of Argentine society no longer being represented by the public policy profile of the Argentine state, some fractions of which internalise and reflect the interests of international capital and forces of neoliberal globalisation.

This exploration of post-neoliberalism and Argentina will proceed in three parts. The first will examine in detail the concept of post-neoliberalism, generating a framework for understanding the model rooted in the concept of the ‘developmental regime’ (Pempel, 1999; see also, Wylde, 2012). A second section will then operationalise this framework, showing how the changing patterns of the public policy profile, the socio-economic alliances that underpin that profile, and the associated institutions of the state in Argentina have been the product of a changing suite of state policies, underpinned by the attempt to forge a new post-crisis social contract in Argentina. A third section will then conclude. This analysis will show how the ‘new’ political economy of post-neoliberalism is the product of a ‘regime tripod’ – the interaction of socio-economic alliances, a public policy profile, and institutions, determined both domestically and internationally – which in its totality represents a developmental regime that is sufficiently distinct, yet simultaneously a development within and from the neoliberal state. That is to say, post-neoliberalism represents a chronological successor to neoliberalism but achieves little analytical value beyond this as it is unable to distinguish between very different constellations of power as present in states such as Brazil, Chile, or Argentina.

**State, Economy, and Society in Post-Neoliberalism**

The state is the central unit of analysis in any understanding of post-neoliberalism. Characterisation of post-neoliberal regimes to date (see for example, Yates and Bakker, 2014: 74-5) are sensitive to the fact that neoliberalism itself does not represent merely a policy approach by governments and politicians, but, simultaneously, both a specific form of domestic social contract (or set of state-society relationships) and a deep structural change represented in more sophisticated understandings of globalisation. As Cerny (2014) suggests, ‘[r]ather than disembedded global markets, in the Polanyian sense, having a direct impact on trade, financial, agricultural, and industrial policies and the like, neoliberalism has become embedded in the complex infrastructures of the global economy’. It is therefore the task of the rest of this section to outline a theory of the neoliberal state that overtly recognises the need to move beyond public policy in order to then build an understanding of the *post-*neoliberal state that does the same.

*The Neoliberal State*

As Phil Cerny (amongst many others) has suggested, neoliberalism is the hegemonic paradigm in the world today, and has maintained that dominance in the face of global transitions in patterns of trade, investment, production, technology, knowledge, and security because of its flexibility and adaptability (Cerny, 2014: 359). From the original tenets of the Chicago school as implemented by Reaganism and Thatcherism, global neoliberalism has transformed itself both in its heartlands of the USA and UK and in its periphery in the developing world; a transformation that has been captured through the terms Washington Consensus and post-Washington Consensus (and in policy terms characterised by the transition from SAPs to PRSPs). This article is not the place for a fine-grained chronological analysis of the development of (global) neoliberalism and its associated mechanisms - this has been achieved elsewhere already (see, for example, Harvey 2005; Crouch, 2011; Overbeek and van Apeldoorn, 2012) - but a common set of principles, or 'guiding thread' can nevertheless be highlighted in order to facilitate a more detailed discussion of the characteristics of *post*-neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism is a combination of neoclassical economics and a commitment to the ‘Austrian-Libertarian’ tradition as the source of political rhetoric (Chang, 2003: 77). Neoclassicism is the approach in economics of analysing how individuals and firms should behave to maximise their own objective functions, assuming that activities are co-ordinated by the price mechanism, and that markets clear so that the economy is in equilibrium at all times (Black, 2002:318). As a result, neoliberalism possesses three main strands of critique of the role of the state in the market. First, there is an affiliation with contractarian political philosophy in the sense that any extension of the role of the state beyond ‘night watchman’ is morally unacceptable. Therefore, economic efficiency should be sacrificed for the sake of individual freedom should the two clash (Friedman, 1962; Chang, 2003: 47). Second, state intervention in a complex modern economy is doomed to failure due to problems of informational costs and uncertainty. The suitable imperative to provide ‘order’ in an economy is that of the market, not state planning. ‘If the fundamental uncertainties pervading the market process do not allow us to identify the ideal against which market failures are to be identified, namely, the neoclassical competitive equilibrium, the whole exercise in welfare economics becomes pointless’ (Chang, 2003: 48). Third, neoliberals subscribe to the government failure approach, which rejects the welfare economics view of the state as a benign and omnipotent social guardian that maximises social welfare. The state is an agent that serves the interests of politically influential groups, which means that state intervention is likely to create allocative inefficiencies, ‘organisational slacks’, and rent-seeking, rather than the correction of market failures (Munck, 2005: 60-61).

Neoliberals view the role of the state in the development process as facilitating the realisation of statically efficient markets. This is achieved through wholesale liberalisation, which in turn sets in train a process of ‘getting the prices right’ (Rapley, 2008). Domestically this means deregulation of the product and factor markets, whilst internationally this means opening up to trade and following the law of comparative advantage. Politically, this means the de-politicisation of the economic policy-making and implementation processes through the contraction or ‘rolling back’ (Ibid.) of the state through deregulation, and the destruction or restriction of the political influence of interest groups (Chang, 1999: 184). Therefore a competitive market populated by individually insignificant agents provides an objective solution that cannot be politically manipulated, whereas state intervention opens the door for sector interests to assert themselves through their influences on the state’s decisions regarding the distribution of resources.

The relationship between state and civil society, or between politics and economics, in neoliberal theory is that the two are analytically separate (Radice, 2008: 1164). Due to this separation in principle of economics and politics in neoliberal discourse exploitation – the idea that profit derives from the extraction of surplus value from wage labour – takes on a distinctly ‘economic’ semblance (Rupert, 1993: 73). In this analysis power is not political as capitalist class power is based directly on the given relations of production and state power, which ‘defines the juridical conditions of private property, contract and exchange, thus entering implicitly into the constitution and reproduction of the economic sphere, as well as the class powers which reside in that sphere’ (Rupert, 1993: 73). This allows a critique of the neoliberal state, due to the relationship between the public and the private spheres. The historical creation of a private sphere is achieved through the creation of civil society, where individuals could be understood in abstraction from the society in which they were embedded, and thus be able to conceive and pursue their own private interests. The state is therefore defined in neoliberal theory as the social space that is distinct from civil society, and thus is naturally self-limiting.

This ‘market based society’, for Polanyi (1944: 60), means that ‘[i]nstead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system’; or, in other words, ‘a market economy can function only in a market society’. Therefore, the market continuously seeks to make a society in its own image (Munck, 2005: 61). Polanyi’s ‘Great Transformation’ was a story of industrial change in nineteenth century Britain and showed that market society and market rules did not evolve naturally or through some process of self-generation (Munck, 2005: 61). Indeed, as Polanyi argues, ‘the market has been the outcome of a conscious and often violent intervention on the part of the government which imposed the market organisation on society for non-economic ends’ (Polanyi, 1944: 258). Polanyi and others such as Cox (1996) therefore demonstrate that government intervention was crucial to the making of markets in society, rather than the ‘natural’ processes as suggested by the likes of Hayek.

*Post-Neoliberalism*

Post-neoliberalism is constructed on two mutually reinforcing pillars: ‘a set of *political aspirations* centred on “reclaiming” the authority of the state to oversee the construction of a new social consensus and approach to welfare, and [a] set of *economic policies* that seeks to enhance or “rebuild” the capacity of the state to manage the market and the export economy in ways that not only ensure growth but are also responsive to social need and citizenship demands’ (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012: 3). To call post-neoliberalism a new paradigm is somewhat of an overreach; but just calling it a package of simple economic policies is also misleading (Leiva, 2010: 34). As such, the term post-neoliberalism attempts to capture the important ways in which Latin America has tried to shift the terms of the development debate away from a narrow embedded neoliberalism (Cerny, 2010), whilst at the same time understanding the relatively limited nature of this shift – especially in the contemporary context of globalisation and the ‘limits of the possible’ (Santiso, 2006; see also Nem Singh, 2014: 336). Counter-cyclical fiscal policies, industrial policy, and the extension of welfare have created developmental regimes across the continent allowing ‘scholars to speak confidently of... post-neoliberalism as something sufficiently distinct from the consensus that reigned in the 1990s [in Latin America]’ (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012: 3), as well as across the post-Lehman developed world today. However, post-neoliberalism was never meant as a ‘concept’ as such. Rather, its intention was more to characterise a transition in the broader processes of development in Latin America (Grugel, 2014). As aresultit was never going to be fit for purpose as a concept that could help capture both the broad movement that has been the pink tide in Latin America (and also other forms of resistance to global neoliberalism such as *Syriza* in Greece or *Podemos* in Spain) and the real and existing differences between the developmental politics and strategies of states within Latin America. Post-neoliberalism is not, and cannot be, useful for distinguishing between regimes in, for example, Chile versus regimes in Argentina. For this intellectual task we need supplementary theories; with this article proposing the efficacy of the developmental regime tripod approach (Pempel, 1999).

What post-neoliberalism represents is a simultaneous repositioning of the state both in terms of domestic social contracts and international political economy; a repositioning that manifests itself in a specific public policy profile. This public policy profile can be characterised as developmental, although with characteristics peculiar to each state given their different institutional and historical legacies of previous models of development and political economy – not least neoliberalism. These peculiarities require fine grained, grounded analysis of individual countries in order to establish the mechanisms by which different constellations of public policy emerge. These mechanisms are grounded in the different patterns of socio-economic alliances and social relations of production that underpin the power of the state, and in their totality represent the social contract between the people and the state that facilitates public policy.

This task represents only one side of the coin. The other side is concerned with the contemporary nature of international political economy (IPE). To talk of an inexorable logic of neoliberalism is too simplistic a characterisation of contemporary globalisation. Instead, the multiple overlapping processes, ideas, and institutions that collectively constitute globalisation should be understood as contingent, historically specific, and subject to change in any given national context. In other words, the external pressures of globalisation are interpreted and refracted through the lens of the state; an entity which itself is fundamentally shaped by its own constellation of domestic socio-economic alliances and social relations – historically specific and institutionally grounded.

The rest of this section will outline a framework for understanding the changes associated with a transition from a neoliberal state to a post-neoliberal state in a manner that is sensitive to the limited nature of this shift and rooted in an understanding of the limited nature of the emancipatory potential that results from this realisation. Characterisation of the shift towards post-neoliberalism is best framed in terms of Grugel and Riggirozzi’s ‘twin pillars’ schematic (2012: 2). The first of these pillars is expressed in terms of the state-market dichotomy; or, in other words, the return of the state as a central actor in the development process. As outlined in the previous section, the neoliberal state aspires to a minimal role for the state – wary of even minimal intervention in areas such as public goods. Whilst there is clearly a role to play in terms of enforcement of principle’s such as the rule of law and private property, the issues of rent seeking and capture of the state by private interests are great enough to be wary of any form of state intervention in the market mechanism. The post-neoliberal state in this respect can be seen to be closer to that of classic developmental state theory. Active industrial policy – both in micro terms in the form of specific sector subsidies and macro form through active management of the exchange rate – is more the norm, with targeted state assistance in domestic markets. This assistance is of course limited, as a result of both legacies of neoliberal ideology and the (not so) residual institutional forms that reproduce those relations, as well as the forces of neoliberal globalisation, always shaping the ‘limits of the possible’ (Santiso, 2006) in IPE.

The second pillar of post-neoliberalism concerns its political project, and is best expressed in terms of a state-society dichotomy. In other words, the drive towards a ‘new’ social consensus in Latin American post-neoliberal states can best be understood in the context of aspects of state theory that seek to reflect on the socio-economic relations that underpin any political project. As the previous section suggested, under neoliberalism societal relations are abstracted away from the state in a drive to separate the two. However, Polanyi demonstrated that the creation of a market state requires a market society – or in the contemporary context a neoliberal state requires a neoliberal society. Mapping the contours of a post-neoliberal society in the context of a post-neoliberal state therefore becomes imperative. Such contours include a more inclusive form of welfarism that moves beyond a lexicon of austerity and self-help, plugging the social lacuna left by such principles of neoliberalism through a more socially inclusionary, or ‘capacity building’ model of welfare. Capacity building in this context conforms with Sen (1999) and his concept of ‘human capabilities’: a notoriously difficult concept to define but perhaps best distilled down into development in poverty reduction, improvements in health and education, enhancing democracy, and more participatory and inclusive forms of welfarism and corporatism. However, given the nature of both the domestic institutional legacy of neoliberalism, and the ever present forces of neoliberal globalisation, the limited nature of this shift cannot be overemphasised. The post-neoliberal state does not represent a radical departure from neoliberal concepts of society and welfare, although a limited shift towards more inclusive social contracts is sufficiently distinct to justify the existence of a chronological successor to the neoliberal state in contemporary Latin America.

In the context of active management of the economy by the state, those aspects of state-societal relations that become most important are those that best facilitate ‘autonomy’ and ‘capacity’. These are the key variables that distinguish between successful (i.e. developmental) outcomes and unsuccessful (i.e. clientelistic, populist, and neo-patrimonial) outcomes of state intervention in the development process. State autonomy is best defined as the formulation and pursuit of goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society; and state capacity is best defined as the ability to implement goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socio-economic circumstances (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, 1985: 9). States must be viewed as configurations of organisation and action that influence the meanings and methods of politics for all groups and classes in society. In other words (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, 1985: 21): ‘states matter not simply because of the goal orientated activities of state officials. They matter because their organisational configurations, along with overall patterns of activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation and collective political actions (but not others) and make possible the raising of certain political issues (but not others).’ Cardoso echoes this concept well when he says that ‘one cannot see the state just as an expression of class interests, without recognising that such an expression requires an organisation which, since it cannot be other than a social network of people, exists in its own right and possesses interests of its own’ (Cardoso, 1979: 51).

Research on capacity has centred on the nature of the business-state relationship in a developmental state and the presence of a domestic capitalist class who articulate their interests and concerns via interest groups and chambers of commerce, so the state does not to reduce itself to crony capitalism (Wu, 2008)and (neo)patrimonial politics (Rapley, 2008). Furthermore, capitalists make up for their shortcomings, which in a developing country centre on the fact that they do not yet contribute large amounts to the national economy, by linking their businesses to entry points in the state. This produces a two-way information flow as not only can the capitalists express their concerns to policymakers, but policymakers can communicate more effectively with chief players in the economy (Rapley, 2008). In the context of the NICs this manifested itself at one end in the form of a competent state bureaucracy - usually with a pilot agency with overall strategic responsibility for industrialisation (MITI in the Japanese example) - that had organisational and institutional links at the other end with major private sector firms and capitalists.

Somewhat paradoxically, the linkages between state and society (or bureaucracy and domestic bourgeoisie more specifically) must be complemented with state autonomy. Traditional developmental state theory views the state to be necessarily separate from society in order to insulate it from competing interests (a classic authoritarian state), and those who may bear the costs of economic development incurred due to the lack of perfect mobility of factors of production. Johnson (1987) has argued that whilst there is no necessary connection between the developmental state and authoritarianism there is an ‘elective affinity’ between the two, echoing the work of O’Donnell (1973) and his analysis of the connection between bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America and their emphasis on heavy industrialisation. Bruce Cumings (1999: 69) argues that ‘theoretically speaking… there is no reason why this [the link between the developmental state and authoritarianism] has to be.’ The traditional reason has of course been because of autonomy, but Bruce Cumings reminds us that there are other ways of achieving autonomy that are different from an authoritarian government.

Peter Evans (1995) coined the term *embedded autonomy* to better characterise state autonomy within a developmental state beyond simple separation of the state from society through authoritarianism. Drawing together the work on capacity and state bureaucracies with the concept of state autonomy his argument suggests that a Weberian style bureaucracy in the sense of selective, meritocratic entrance requirements and independent long-term career rewards gives them autonomy. However, here he departs from Weber and suggests that far from being insulated from society, ‘they are embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies’ (Evans, 1995: 12). These ties are predominantly with captains of industry - or domestic bourgeoisie - and it is this embedded autonomy that best facilitates the state’s role in industrial transformation.

Evans and his concept of embedded autonomy was critiqued as having an inadequate or incomplete understanding of state-society relationships. It was not a sufficient explanation of successful development experience as *both* strong states and strong economic groups in society are needed to create ‘governed interdependence’ (Weiss, 1998: 38). Pempel’s (1999: 157) analysis captures this well when he critiques the developmental state literature for privileging the political and economic role played by state bureaucrats. This is because they are treated as totally depoliticised, socially disembodied, and in rational pursuit of a self-evident national interest (ibid.: 144). In the words of Chalmers Johnson (1982: 356) ‘politicians merely reign, whereas the bureaucrats actually rule’. This led Bruce Cumings (1999: 61) to suggest that the state then emerges as a ‘web without a spider’, or the observation that ‘if not from the politicians from whom do bureaucrats get their sense of direction?’ (ibid.: 145). Bureaucracies may well be rational, but in whose interests are they rational? One answer could be the national interest, derived from the possible interests of the politicians or at least of those in power.

The developmental state's preoccupation with the insulation of state bureaucrats as key to economic development can therefore be (re)interpreted as theoretically constricting. Evans falls into a trap of circular reasoning through emphasising the role and character of the state’s bureaucracy at the expense of other explanatory factors. In other words, he reduces the basis of legitimacy for state-led developmental intervention to bureaucratic links with industrial capital. The possibility of legitimacy based on other forms of state-society relationship, or indeed multiples and combinations of different relationships, is not considered. As Pempel (1999: 147) suggests, ‘bureaucratic autonomy and mandarinate competence in the absence of numerous other conditions are thin reeds on which to rest a strategy of economic development’. In a critique of the developmental state literature in terms of its analysis of bureaucracies, Woo- Cumings (1999: 31) contends that ‘trimming some bureaucratic fat off the developmental state does not mean the end of the developmental state; rather, it is a requirement for survival’.

This opens the door to the possibility of different 'developmental regimes' (Pempel, 1999; Wylde, 2012; 2014), based on different constellations of socio-economic interests rooted in state-society relationships that go beyond the narrow confines of embedded autonomy and the developmental state concept. Post-neoliberalism captures a broad trend in shifting development strategies in Latin America (and increasingly more widely beyond Latin America), but it requires the regime tripod concept to drill down into the fine-grained empirical detail to distinguish between different post-neoliberal regimes: not all neoliberal states become neo-developmental, and not all post-neoliberal states share the same understanding of development. What the regime tripod offers is a framework for the understanding of specific institutional forms of state-led developmentalism grounded in a constellation of state-society relationships seen as both a departure from and a function of previous forms of social contract grounded in a neoliberal theory of the state.

*The Regime Tripod in Post-Neoliberalism*

Post-neoliberalism is best understood as a form of developmental neoliberalism: an historical evolution from the neoliberal state grounded in an understanding of the state as a condensation of historical and contemporary institutions, both domestic and international. In order to flesh out this concept the rest of this section will introduce the concept of the ‘regime tripod’: the interplay of socio-economic alliances, institutions, and a public policy profile (Pempel, 1999) that facilitate a given form of state. This will provide a concrete framework for operationalising an interpretation of Argentina under the presidency of CFK in the next section of this article.

The first leg of the tripod is socio-economic alliances. The idea that socio-economic alliances underpin, and are underpinned by, the state is not a new concept. At a theoretical level Marxist analysis of the state as (in its most basic form) the executive committee of the bourgeoisie reflects this opinion well. This is also equally true of Weberian pluralist analysis which emphasises perhaps more social alliances as well as economic ones. At an historical level this has also been demonstrated. For example, Alexander Gerschenkron demonstrated that authoritarianism in Germany was derived from the alliance of ‘iron & rye’ (read: Saxony/Rhineland industrialists and Junker landlords) (Gerschenkron, cited in Pempel 1998: 23), or Collier & Collier’s work on showing how labour’s inclusion or exclusion from such alliances shaped the political evolution of eight Latin American countries (Collier & Collier, cited in Ibid.).

The socio-economic alliances that underpin neoliberalism vary over time and space. Nevertheless, enough common ground can be found to offer some tentative thoughts on how projects of neoliberal political economy have become embedded across the world, rendering it the hegemonic model of capital accumulation today. The first factor to appreciate is the global nature of the neoliberal project, revealing the twin forces at play in its spread across the planet: first, international coercive forces, and second, domestic consensual forces. The international forces of transnational capital - represented by TNCs, investors in global capital markets, private organisations in global civil society such as credit ratings agencies, and IFIs - used the hammer of the 'competition state' (Cerny, 1997) against the nail of neoliberalism. In this competition state the welfare of society is understood as secondary to the need to secure capital accumulation, the benefits of which would 'trickle down' to the rest of the population.

The suite of policies associated with forging this neoliberal model of capital accumulation (see below on public policy profile) create a series of domestic 'winners' (in addition to those international winners detailed above) who facilitate consent to the system through what J.K. Galbraith termed 'the culture of contentment' (Galbraith, 1992). Those winners tend to be the transnationally orientated corporate sector, financiers, Western educated technocratic and policy-making elites, skilled workers such as scientists, managers, academics, and other professionals - often employed in transnational or internationally oriented companies. In other words, specific elements of the middle classes. Furthermore, members of the working classes employed in transnational companies and national enterprises that have managed to competitively engage with the global economy also form part of the constellation of socio-economic alliances that help embed neoliberalism as a model of capital accumulation in national contexts (Chodor, 2015: 61).

In post-neoliberal developmental regimes the constellation of socio-economic alliances is both qualitatively and quantitatively different. Qualitatively in terms of the particular ensemble of alliances, and quantitatively in the sense that the ensemble is much more broader based - and therefore more akin to the post-war Keynesian consensus in this sense. The big losers from the shift to neoliberalism - national capital, organised working classes, and minorities - to greater or lesser degrees depending on the national context, undergo conscious attempts by the post-neoliberal state to be (re)incorporated into the national social contract. This can occur in the form of (re)invigorated corporatist practices, suites of policies towards indigenous peoples (land reform, profit sharing from extractive practices), and state driven industrial policies. Interestingly, not all those winners from the neoliberal social contract are ejected - the reorientation of post-neoliberal developmental regimes is not a zero sum game in this sense. For example, transnational forces are still engaged with, albeit on a more selective basis. Middle classes are kept on board through maintaining strong macroeconomic fundamentals that facilitate saving and conspicuous consumption. Whilst financial capital and financiers are often marginalised, they are not necessarily totally excluded as capital (both international and domestic) is needed to finance industrial policy and infrastructure investment. Private property is still honoured, the economies remain largely (or even increasingly) open to international trade, and macroeconomic frameworks remain conducive to repayment of international debt obligations.

These socio-economic alliances are underpinned and reinforced by policies of the state, or the second leg of any regime tripod. A regime’s public policies (both in the political and economic spheres) are ‘tangible manifestations of the regime’s power configuration’ (Pempel 1998: 27). Policies are not simply the product of those socio-economic relationships, as it must always be remembered that the state acts as a mediator between the desires of specific social groups and the policies that these desires crystallise into. Furthermore, these interests are both shaped and mediated by contemporary IPE – which in the modern era is largely a function of neoliberal globalisation. This is the concept of state autonomy: a feature of the state that overcomes its capture by specific interests (both domestic and international) and gives it the ability to serve the longer term (developmental) interests of the state and its society.

In a neoliberal state these policies come in the form of favouring strong individual property rights, the rule of law, and facilitating/creating the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade (Harvey, 2005: 64). Neoliberals are particularly assiduous in seeking the privatisation of assets: an extension of the principle of strong and clear individual property rights. The free mobility of capital between sectors, regions, and countries is regarded as crucial as this improves efficiency, productivity, and lowers prices - therefore combating inflationary pressures. With personal and individual freedom in the marketplace guaranteed, individuals are considered accountable for their own actions; a principle that extends into welfare, education, healthcare, and pensions. This leads to minimal 'safety net' responses to welfare, rather than comprehensive welfare states associated with social democracy. In practice, these policies do not always (in fact never) manifest themselves in an 'ideal' form. For example, the EU pushes a free trade agenda, but not in agriculture through the CAP. Similarly the USA maintains high barriers to trade in areas such as steel or maize - usually because Presidents want to win key battleground states like Ohio or Iowa (Harvey, 2005: 71).

In post-neoliberal states public policy profiles reflect both continuities and changes with these practices. In terms of continuity, private property is still central and free trade is still broadly followed. There are, of course, exceptions such as the drive for greater communal land rights for indigenous groups and the use of the state to ensure these. Macroeconomic frameworks are conducive to debt reduction, fiscal conservativism, and (broad) price stability. Welfare policies are usually kept within the safety net model and come in the form of CCTs - designed to catch individuals from falling into indigence rather than lifting individuals up to a basic standard of living. In terms of change, there is greater scope for state intervention in the economy beyond facilitating market friendly conditions. This comes in the form of industrial policies such as sector subsidies, infrastructure investment, currency manipulation, or selective protectionism. Collectively these can be considered as 'developmental' in the sense of the state guiding and coaxing markets to work for the national interest, rather than that of international capital. However, under globalisation the level of state autonomy from the forces of globalisation and the class interests that they represent are limited, or 'passive' (Cohen, 2006: 46); they exist de-jure in different configurations of formal sovereignty, but increasingly less de-facto in terms of the capacity to act with operational independence. Whilst this is no doubt true, the point must not be over-emphasised and this article contends that the existence of post-neoliberal developmental regimes suggests simultaneously the presence of limits that global neoliberalism place on state autonomy, and the fact that these limitations should not be over exaggerated.

Not only must the 'right' (developmental) policies be pursued in any given situation of state autonomy, but they must also be implemented in an appropriate manner; or, the state must possess the necessary capacity. In traditional developmental state theory the study of capacity has focused on bureaucracies but, as the previous section analysed, a contemporary (developmental) regime – or post-neoliberal state – must necessarily embody a set of state-society relationships that move beyond narrow conceptions of bureaucratic autonomy combined with specific ties with business elites. In order to be effectively developmental in the twenty-first century the post-neoliberal (developmental) state (regime) must take more responsibility, achieve greater autonomy in relation to private elites and the forces of neoliberal globalisation, and construct more complex and demanding forms of embeddedness’ (Evans, 2008: 17). Therefore, successful capacity relies upon a ‘very broad range of state-society ties necessary for the effective delivery of capability expanding services’ (Evans, 2008: 18).

In order to help capture this concept of capacity with the developmental regime framework, the third leg of the tripod is needed: institutions. These can be defined as the formal organisations of the state and society: government institutions, economic institutions, and those that connect government, economy and society (Pempel 1998: 23-26). Government institutions include areas such as the civil service, courts, parliaments, cabinets, the military, and the police. Economic institutions broadly express how the state interacts with the market, both domestically and internationally. A highly individualistic market driven agenda (i.e. neoliberal) will produce different economic institutions to those that express extensive concentration and coordination of market power by the state (i.e. developmental regime, or post-neoliberal state). Such constellations will be reflected in areas such as central banks, corporate structures, legal economic frameworks, and patent regulations. Examples of neoliberal institutions include independent central banks with sole responsibility for inflation targeting (e.g. the Bank of England), or corporate structures with weak trade unions and strong business associations. Post-neoliberal central banks could remain independent, but have multiple targeting responsibilities such as employment, stable currencies, or even welfare (as in Argentina - see next section). Corporate structures tend to be more evenly weighted between business and organised labour, although not so far as to be dominated by labour such as historical forms of Peronism in Argentina for example.

Institutions that connect the government, economy, and society include areas such as electoral systems, interest associations, party systems, and economic policy networks. For example, neoliberal states will be dominated by a strong emphasis on judicial rule and strict constitutionality, as solutions and remedies to problems are to be sought by individuals through the legal system (Harvey, 2005: 67). Post-neoliberal developmental regimes will possess a greater commitment to real, substantive democracy - represented through a desire to articulate the desires of broader categories of its citizens and, indeed, to redefine the notion of citizenship itself beyond an analytical separation of state from society (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012).

Institutions regularise the organisations of decision-making through which the regime channels and manifests its power. Such institutionalisation of a regime is essential to ensure longevity beyond any single administration. Whilst a regime can, and indeed must, begin with one administration, its longevity beyond a single administration relies heavily on the continuity facilitated by the presence of institutions. Institutions ensure ‘organisational mechanisms that remain relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals’ (Pempel 1998: 23). Such continuity and relative invariance of organisational mechanisms at the government, economic, and societal levels reflects the presence of a regime. This is echoed in the work of Kohli (2004: 16-19), where he suggests that institutions are social patterns that gel only over time; and once gelled, they often endure beyond the forces that brought them into being. In the words of Schumpeter (2003[1942]: 12) ‘they are coins that do not readily melt’.

**The regime tripod under Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner**

Having outlined an appropriate framework for understanding post-neoliberal states, this final section will operationalise this concept in the context of Argentina under CFK. In so doing, it will not only demonstrate the efficacy of the post-neoliberal concept in analysing contemporary Argentina but also shed further light on the dynamics of that country through analysis of its regime tripod. This section will conclude that there are some inherent weaknesses in the post-neoliberal project (in the Argentine case at least) due to both an overreliance on international commodity markets and a relative lack of institutionalisation of its new constellation of state-society relations.

*Public Policy Profile*

The fundamental reformulation of the state in post crisis Argentina towards post-neoliberalism was carried forward by Néstor Kirchner in 2003, after initiation by Eduardo Duhalde in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis (Ozarow *et al.*, 2014: 6). This manifested itself in a redefinition, and associated strengthening, of the state in two core aspects. First, the role of the state as an agent of redistribution for social justice; second, the state as regulator of markets. The redefinition of the role of government was in the context of the neoliberalism of Carlos Menem in the 1990s, where the government was an 'absent state' (Kirchner, cited in Cohen, 2012: 106). This facilitated redistribution policies through improving revenue collection that would be used for increases in public expenditures - with an increase in the net total of tax collection as a percentage of GDP increasing from 23.43 percent in 2003 to 33.66 percent by 2010 (Mecon, 2010). These public expenditures were focused on poverty reduction and social deprivation through a variety of *Planes.* Whilst the first - *Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar* - was initiated under Duhalde, under Nestor Kirchner this programme was actually run-down by preventing new entrants and instead placing them on his own *Planes* (Beccaria et. al., 2007): *PlanesTrabajar* and *Plan Familias*. These were expanded under CFK in terms of the number as well as the scope. One particularly important flagship policy was the AUH (*Asignacion Universal por Hijo*). Initiated in 2010 this programme provides approximately 200 Argentine pesos a month for nearly 4 million children and families (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012: 9). Collectively, these policies facilitated a reduction in the poverty rate ($2/day at PPP) from 16.4 percent in 2003 to 2.9 percent by 2011 (see Table 1), although this must be treated with caution given the government manipulation of INDEC - the official statistical agency of the state (see later section on institutions) - after 2007. However, even if alternative data is used - such as the Catholic University data set - whilst the figures are higher, they still display the same general downward trend (see Table 1). Increases in per capita public spending (in USD at current prices) from $1301 in 2003 to $2002 by 2007 (CEPAL, 2010) reflected this emphasis on social welfare programmes in the form of the various *Planes* as detailed above.

A final broad area where post-crisis Argentina shifted its public policy profile in terms of the state as an agent of redistribution for social justice came in its policies towards the labour market. Precipitous drops in unemployment from 16.1 percent in 2003 at the start of Nestor Kirchner's administration to 7.5 percent in 2013 (see Table 1), steadily increasing real wages (in spite of significant inflation post 2007), several increases in the minimum wage throughout the period, a reduction in the informal labour sector, and a new form of 'segmented neocorporatism' (Etchemendy and Collier, 2007: 363) to manage relations between the state, labour, and business all facilitated a state that was active and interventionist in the labour market in order to help facilitate redistribution of wealth for social justice reasons.

The second core aspect of the post-crisis Argentine public policy profile under Néstor Kirchner came in the form of market regulation. Under Néstor Kirchner Argentina experienced substantial economic growth (see Table 1); with GDP exceeding pre-crisis levels within a year of the start of his administration. The policies that achieved this growth can be grouped under the two main themes of macroeconomic policy and industrial policy. In terms of macroeconomics, the administration adopted an exchange rate policy that Frenkel & Rapetti (2008: 217) have termed a ‘Stable and Competitive Real Exchange Rate’ (SCRER). This was one of a suite of policies that led to a significant boost in exports, manifesting in a sustained surplus in the current account (see Table 1). Furthermore, given the presence of export taxes, this policy also helped to provide sustained fiscal surpluses (see Table 1), as well as expansions of state spending in areas such as welfare (see above), reduction of national debt (see Table 1), and also industrial policy. Whilst the role of record international commodity prices cannot be ignored, Kirchner was still able to harness these forces to maximum benefit, as well as the fact that a significant proportion of the economic growth seen during the period 2003–2007 was in the manufacturing sector (Bezchinsky et al., 2007; Wylde, 2011: 439) and therefore independent of the reversal in terms of trade during this time.

Industrial policy centred on encouraging production, or more specifically the industrial sectors of the economy, at the expense of the financial sector, or more specifically banking and capital markets. Large public works programmes, selective protective tariffs, selective subsidies for industries, the promotion of SMEs through favourable access to credit, combined with the central plank of the SCRER, all represented a coordinated attempt to promote Argentine national capitalism under Néstor Kirchner. This all occurred under a broad acceptance of core neoliberal principles - the importance of conservative fiscal policy and budget surpluses, steady inflation (see Table 1), an awareness of inefficiencies associated with many forms of state intervention and state ownership, the acceptance of the primacy of the market in setting prices, the abandonment of economic protectionism in favour of at least relative economic opening and regional integration, and - albeit cautious and selective - welcoming of foreign direct investment (Wylde, 2011: 439-440).

**INSERT TABLE 1 HERE**

During the presidency of CFK from 2008 onwards a number of underlying issues have manifested themselves into a number of strain points that have facilitated shifts in this broad public policy profile. The first area of tension has been concerning relations with domestic rural oligarchs, agricultural TNCs, and the state. In 2008 there was widespread social unrest as farmers all over the country blocked major routes and roads to ports and cities, preventing the passing of trucks transporting agricultural commodities. This was in response to the government's announcement of an extension of *retenciones* on soyabean products from 35 percent to 45 percent, greatly affecting soy, maize, wheat, and sunflower seed producer's interests. Due to the flat nature of the tax it produced an unlikely coalition of interests between rural oligarch’s, TNC’s, and medium and small scale producers (Cohen, 2012: 133).

Second, there have been those creditors who did not agree to the debt swap and haircut in 2005 (and in 2010 after a second deal was struck by CFK with 93 percent of the holdouts from 2005), or at least the vulture funds (such as Elliott Management) who bought the outstanding debt on secondary markets. These firms have been using legal systems in friendly countries to try to force Argentina to repay on defaulted debt in full, including accrued interest. This has led to a ‘technical default’ in August 2014, and the protracted locking out of Argentina from international capital markets – facilitating a shortage of foreign currency domestically.

Third, there has been widespread unrest from September 2012 across the country, including rioting and looting in December 2012 (Economist, 2012: 47; Economist, 2013: 32). The rioters have been a mix, involving middle classes protesting against foreign exchange restrictions, curbs on imported goods, and high inflation making it impossible to save. Also present have been organised labour movements protesting against lower real wages as a result of high inflation, demanding further extensions in welfare provision, and wanting greater involvement in the creation of state policy like they did in under previous regimes such as those of Péron (Ibid: 48).

The collapse of international demand that followed the global financial crisis hit Argentine exports hard. A key cornerstone of Argentine political economy post 2001 has been the rise in exports. As well as the direct impact on exports of a manufacturing origin, this dynamic has also served to restrict the revenues gained from agricultural exports due to an associated declining terms of trade. This was exacerbated in 2012 by severe drought which affected yields. In turn, this has impacted on Argentina’s public finances. Since export taxes (*retenciones*) were reintroduced in 2002 they have become an important source of state income, representing an average of 12 percent of budget revenues (INDEC, 2010). The attempt to increase *retenciones* by CFK in 2008 can be seen as a direct response to these changing international dynamics, coupled with a desire to maintain fiscal surpluses in the face of declining revenues.

The drop in international demand for Argentina’s exports has also facilitated downward pressure on its nominal exchange rate. This trend was further exacerbated by the need to import increasing amounts of energy to fuel Argentina’s rapid economic expansion in the absence of domestic investment in energy production. In turn, this has eroded Argentina’s current account surplus. A drop in the nominal exchange rate has combined with increasing inflation to increase Argentina’s Real Exchange Rate (see Table 1), further eroding export competitiveness and thus further eroding the current account surplus. This erosion of the current account surplus (to a small deficit by 2011) threatened to undermine one of the key cornerstones of *Kirchnerismo*. Persistent current account deficits in the 1990s during neoliberal restructuring led to excessive foreign debt accumulation, mounting on top of an already significant debt accrued during the bureaucratic-authoritarian period. Ultimately this helped precipitate economic meltdown in 2001-02 and the associated dislocation of Argentine politics and society (Svampa, 2014).

A number of CFK’s policies can therefore be interpreted as attempts to correct these pressures on the current account balance. A series of foreign exchange restrictions to prevent domestic US dollar hoarding has facilitated tensions with middle class elements of Argentine society as foreign travel and holidays become more expensive. In addition, a number of import restrictions, as well as measures to require businesses that import to also export goods, have widened these tensions to domestic bourgeois elements of the middle classes. The re-nationalisation of YPF in an attempt to reignite energy investment and thus reduce the levels of imported energy (which in turn will help relieve pressure on the current account balance) also created tensions with elements of international capital.

These underlying trends were exacerbated by high inflation after 2007 (see Table 1), causing further tensions amongst different socio-economic groups in Argentine society. The middle classes, once again, have been hit through difficulties in saving given the level of inflation in the economy; especially when combined with the foreign exchange restrictions that make it difficult to use the US dollar as a more inflation proof store of value. The working classes and trade unions have been hit as a result of the erosion of real wages that this has begun to facilitate. Whilst there has been some redistribution to these elements of Argentine society as a result of the state taking responsibility for economic growth, these have begun to be undermined in 2012 as growth has stalled but the inflationary trend persisted. Many of the poorest in Argentina have been protected from this trend through a persistently expansionary fiscal stance that has seen the extension of welfare benefits beyond the more traditional clientelist links with trade union organisations (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012: 9). Therefore, whilst important in the political context of increasing tensions between the Argentine state and organised labour, the impact of inflation on real income levels of the poor should not be over exaggerated.

*Socio-economic Alliances*

The public policy profile of Néstor Kirchner served to forge a new set of socio-economic alliances in post-crisis Argentina. Begun by Duhalde, and continued and consolidated under Néstor Kirchner this led to the forging of a new social contract between the state and the Argentine people. First, the poor and working classes have clearly benefited from both expanding welfare combined with expanding employment opportunities. In addition, substantial increases in the minimum wage have complemented these trends. Second, trade union groups have formed part of the alliance, although not as central a role as under former models of capital accumulation such as *Peronismo*. This is due to the fact that welfare provision has moved beyond formal unionised sectors of society and into family life, thus reducing the influence of clientelistic links present between the state and the trade union movement present under *Peronismo* (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012)*.*Third, middle-class elements were brought into the regime. The stabilisation of the macroeconomic environment from 2003 onwards combined an exchange rate policy that favoured domestic bourgeoisie elements (and especially exporters) brought these elements into the *Kirchnerismo* model. Furthermore, the consumer boom that such policies facilitated fed into underlying middle-class support, ensuring that the state brought widespread benefits across different class fractions rather than simply representing any one discreet class or class fraction. Finally, stimulation of exports also favoured agro-industrialists. Given that the agro-industry in Argentina is dominated by TNCs (especially soy) this policy also brought these interests of international capital into the model.The post-neoliberal model of political economy in Argentina can be summarised as a desire to re-install the productivist pact between labour and capital as seen under *Peronismo*, with the state acting as the key arbiter of those interests (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012: 5). Although, with some key differences in terms of more antagonistic relations with labour and a less fractious relationship with business (Etchemendy and Collier, 2007).

The policies of CFK have represented departures from her husband’s more cautious and pragmatic approach. They have been the result of twin forces at play in contemporary Argentina. First, the deteriorating international economic conditions, in contrast to the relatively benign international economic environment that prevailed in the 2003-2009 period; the collapse of international demand in the wake of the GFC has severely impacted on Argentina’s export driven growth model. This was also exacerbated by a fall in international commodity prices in 2009 (see Table 1) as agricultural commodities still represented by far the largest share of Argentine exports. However, this should not be overemphasised as Table 1 also shows that international commodity prices soon bounced back after 2009, and also a number of other countries in the region were not as affected by the same changes in prices (Bolivia for example). The second factor that has played a significant role in the deterioration of GDP growth (see Table 1) has been Cristina's policies intended to 'deepen the model'. This has come in the form of extending welfare - through for example the AUH - and extension of the minimum wage to non-unionised workers, counter-cyclical fiscal spending in the wake of the GFC, and maintaining (even increasing) subsidies and price controls in a number of areas - especially transport, energy, and fuel. Cristina's heterodox policies have , prevented outright recession, maintained reductions in poverty, and reductions in the GINI (see Table 1), but at the expense of rampant inflation, and the key loss of the twin surpluses in the current and fiscal accounts. Most significantly, her administration's policies have served to unravel core aspects of the socio-economic alliances that underpinned *Kirchnerismo* in the immediate post-crisis period. By abandoning fiscal and current account surpluses, by allowing inflation to erode the SCRER, and by using export restrictions to limit the amount of foreign exchange in the domestic economy, Cristina's extension of the post-neoliberal developmental regime in Argentina became incoherent and unsustainable. In other words, whilst the suite of unorthodox economic policies worked in correcting a number of adverse trends and pressures on the Argentine economy (but not others), these policies served to undermine the constellation of social relations that underpinned the post-crisis development model; a constellation that has always been vulnerable given the lack of institutionalisation of these newly forged post-crisis relationships. As a result, they have often ended up resulting in policies designed to buy certain groups support in a clientelist manner, rather than foster long-term support that could be institutionalised in an enduring manner.

Middle classes were alienated by import restrictions and high inflation. The benefits of macroeconomic stability that CFK has sought to maintain through various heterodox policies have been outweighed by the fallout of those very policies for middle-class interests. In addition, the solution to Argentina's high and persistent inflation has continued to elude CFK; she has refused to sacrifice short-term economic growth prospects - and therefore unemployment and poverty reductions - on the altar of stable prices, even if stable prices may facilitate better medium and long term growth prospects. This has served to further alienate the middle-classes. In addition the formal working classes and trade unions were agitated by real wage declines, the result of the high inflation present in the economy. This has outweighed benefits accrued from the expansion of formal employment as a result of a growing economy. Domestic bourgeoisie have been alienated by the series of heterodox macroeconomic policies of CFK designed to protect the twin surpluses in the current and fiscal accounts. Rural oligarchs and agro-industrialists have seen their profits decline in the face of elevated taxes; and international capital has remained alienated over the protracted dispute over settlement of outstanding defaulted debt from January 2002. Collectively, these measures have served to severely undermine the segmented neo-corporatist (Etchemendy and Collier, 2007) productivist pact between labour and business, mediated by the state. With both business (domestic, transnational, industrial, and rural) and labour (formal and informal) further alienated from both the state and each other a key social compromise that constituted a cornerstone of the post-neoliberal social contract in Argentina has been fractured.

*Institutions*

The process of the institutionalisation of *Kirchnerismo* represents the third leg of the post-neoliberal regime tripod. This section has argued that Argentina's post-crisis political economy of development under CFK has witnessed shifting social relations that have manifested in the exercise of public policy. This has been the result of the twin forces of a changing international environment (represented by the GFC as well as shifting international commodity prices) as well as the desire on the part of the CFK administration to 'deepen the model'. In other words, the degree of state autonomy enjoyed under Néstor Kirchner became significantly reduced under CFK as international forces realigned and, simultaneously, domestic class fractions internalised the imperatives of global capital.

The reducing levels of state autonomy under CFK revealed by analysis of the first two legs of the regime tripod is complemented with a lack of state capacity, revealed by the third institutional leg of the regime tripod. Unlike the changing nature of state autonomy between the two Kirchner's, state capacity in the form of institutionalisation was consistently weak across both Presidents. Whilst under Néstor Kirchner this mattered less due to favourable international circumstances and a post-crisis domestic climate conducive to his brand of post-neoliberal developmentalism, under CFK it added to the general malaise of Argentina's post-neoliberal developmental regime. In the context of political and social institutions this general weakness does not mean that there were not efforts to consolidate certain aspects: rebuilding the regulatory framework around work and labour (Repetto, 2015), expanding rights to civil society groups (such as the improving coverage of social policy, or equalisation of civil rights for sexual minorities), or the introduction of PASO - the open and simultaneous primary elections in national elections. However, these processes were not sufficient to reverse a general situation of institutional weakness, resulting in deficits of state capacities, lack of coordination between different levels of government, lack of mechanisms for the coordination of public policies, and increasing rule through Presidential decree, which in their totality conspired against the development of an efficient, effective, and transparent democratic state (Gervasoni and Peruzotti, 2015).

Similar general patterns can be observed when examining economic institutions, which are arguable of greater importance in the context of state capacity under a developmental regime. There were certain organizational islands that exhibited a successful process of building state capacities, among which stand out the ANSES, the AFIP, CONICET, the Ministry of Science and Technology and Innovation, and specific programs such as *Remediation*, *Nacer*, and *Sumar*. In addition, under CFK the central bank constitution was reformed to establish a new mandate 'to promote, to the extent of its ability and in the framework of policies established by the national government, monetary stability, financial stability, jobs and economic growth with social fairness'. This can be seen as a clear example of an economic institution that reflects post-neoliberal developmental concerns, rather than a more neoliberal Central Bank that is only concerned with inflation targeting. However, these institutional reforms were the result of contingencies and opportunities rather than the result of a systematic effort (Gervasoni and Peruzotti, 2015). Of particular note in the area of institutional weaknesses was the general areas of economic regulation and state promotion of development. For example, despite continued reference to monopolies the National Tribunal for the Defence of Competition was never created. Also, regulatory agencies such as the National Communications Commission, the National Gas Regulatory Body, or the National Transportation Regulatory Commission experienced systemic political interventions and were bureaucratically subordinated to the Executive. The absence of a national development bank was also striking, facilitating poor institutionalisation of the system of public credit for productive investment.

Finally. and perhaps the most high profile example, of institutional weakness that facilitated a lack of development of Argentine state capacity was the saga of the INDEC. Ever since 2008 it has produced dubious data, not least its inflation measurement. The disparity between the official rate and the unofficial rate is shown in Table 1. This has further impacts on poverty data, as their calculation depends on inflation numbers; these disparities are once again shown in Table 1. This manipulation became so unsustainable that INDEC even stopped publishing poverty statistics. The continued manipulation of inflation data, among other key economic indicators, led to an official reprimand by the IMF on 1 February 2013 (Economist, 2013a). Whilst a new, supposedly accurate, inflation measurement was introduced in January 2014 (called the CPINu) there are still questions over its accuracy (Economist, 2014). This (ongoing) saga serves to highlight both the lack of respect, and the lack of development of key institutions of the state which are needed to enhance its capacity to facilitate and manage the development process in Argentina.

**Conclusions**

The analysis of this article has suggested that contemporary Argentina specifically, and post-neoliberalism in general, can be best understood through an analysis of the regime tripod: socio-economic alliances, a public policy profile, and institutions. This tripod analysis reveals a developmental regime characterised as post-neoliberal – a chronological successor to the neoliberal state.It is a successoras it departs in important ways from the neoliberal state: an increased role for the state in managing the development process combined with a greater sensitivity towards the development of capabilities in society; it is nevertheless neoliberal as a state form as it continues to be rooted within domestic institutions that are grounded in these principles as well as being constrained by international forces in the form of neoliberal globalisation.

The developmental regime tripod provides a robust framework for placing the developments of Argentine political economy, and the more general global turn towards post-neoliberalism, in an appropriate context. In terms of post-neoliberalism, whilst this concept helps describe a general global development pattern away from some of the core tenets of neoliberalism it holds little analytical value when it comes to distinguishing between different developmental regimes. It was never intended as such. Analysis of the regime tripod in any given national context helps to develop an understanding of the diachronic and synchronic characteristics of both state autonomy and state capacity, crucial for understanding any given developmental regime and therefore distinguish between the manifestation of post-neoliberalism in say, for example, Argentina versus Brazil. In terms of Argentina, this article has shown how the regime tripod approach is able to articulate the differences between the two Kirchner administrations, highlighting the changing international and domestic contexts through examination of state capacity and state autonomy over time.

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