Other-person-ness and the person with profound disability

This book presents a positive view of the Other as an other, one who is like me but not the same as me, a view that does justice to the radical other-person-ness of the person with profound disabilities. This approach counters both the way in which other-ness and othering have become pejorative ways in which to categorize ‘them’ and ‘us’, and some strategies in disability studies that reduce all people to the same as vulnerable or broken. A deeper appreciation of the Other as an other takes disability and diversity seriously, and it underscores the full dignity of the person with profound disabilities. Disability studies are often regarded as practical studies as opposed to the apparently inevitable theorizing of philosophy or theology. However, this book’s methodology of explicitly linking disability studies with philosophy and theology demonstrates their complementarity. In particular, the philosophical turn to experience in existentialism and personalism shows how philosophy can enrich and challenge disability studies in the area of otherness. Notably in disability studies a philosophical or theological idea may be taken up, but a deeper analysis of that idea can demonstrate both problems and further promise. The book begins by situating the question of the Other in philosophy and the person with profound disabilities in the realities of contemporary discriminatory attitudes. These attitudes are in part mitigated by attempts in disability studies to overcome a ‘them’ and ‘us’ divide. The book then takes the framework proposed by the philosopher Emmanuel Mounier, who was well acquainted with profound disability, to explore the three central branches of other-ness found in twentieth century philosophies of existentialism and personalism. The first branch of other-ness is in opposition to the self and seems to be the dominant way of regarding the other. In terms of disability studies this has resonance with the social model of disability, malignant social psychology, and the challenge to the normal abnormal paradigm of disability. This branch represents the existentialism of Jean Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir and is the basis for thinking of the other in negative and pejorative terms. While Sartre is typically presented as offering the archetypal ‘hell is other people’, his thought is more nuanced, especially regarding epistemology and what can be known of the other. Beauvoir is well-known for presenting the feminine other as a social construct. Less well-known is Beauvoir’s work on ageing and the other, and this has resonance with views on disability. Nevertheless, this branch of other-ness ultimately produces a pejorative way of categorizing the other as ‘them’ and ‘us’. Moreover, solutions like those suggested by Beauvoir do not take account of profound disability and risk the creation of a hierarchy of disability. The second more neglected branch of other-ness as an other who is like me but not me is also related to existentialism and personalism. However, this branch is itself divided into an other-ness that is remedied by the ethics of relationship, and, a third branch, an other-ness that has its foundation in the goodness of being. The second branch of relationship and the priority of ethics over being as presented by Emmanuel Levinas is currently the favoured way of dealing with otherness. Notably, in disability studies the radical other-ness of the person with profound disabilities is generally located in ethical relationships with significant others. However, this approach does not do justice to the being of the person with profound disability since it is heavily dependent on the attitudes of the more powerful to create and sustain relationships. The ethics of relationship then still suffers from the risk of presenting the other in negative terms, indeed Levinas sees the other as a threat to the self. In contrast, the third branch that presents the foundation of the other in the philosophy of being offers a positive account of other-ness. In his analysis of modern philosophy Mounier explains reasons for the neglect of the philosophy of being; Gabriel Marcel and Karol Wojtyła rehabilitate this philosophy. Through reflection on the work of Mounier, Marcel and Wojtyła, the philosophy of being as applied to profound disability is deepened to include participation to overcome alienation, participation as belonging, inclusion and personal contribution, as well as solidarity. This book argues that a restoration of a philosophy of being gives a more solid foundation for people with profound disability who are especially at the mercy of others.